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Abstract 
The primary responsibility of an Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) controller is to prevent collisions between aircraft and 
other hazards on the surface and in the immediate vicinity. The safety service provided by controllers at towers with larger 
operations greatly exceeds the costs of establishing those towers. As the number of operations decreases, the costs of operating 
the tower may begin to outweigh the benefits of staffing the tower. With a focus on visual air traffic services (VATS), this 
assessment aims to examine the safety benefits being provided by controllers at ATCT in Class Delta (D) airspace through safety 
event narratives and airport characteristics. Safety event reports describing instances where an ATCT controller provided a 
service that reduced the consequences of the event were collected. The reports were classified to identify latent factors, causal 
factors, and positive safety benefits. The adverse causal factors and positive safety benefits were then utilized to determine 
statistically significant risk-benefit pathways describing the safety benefits that controllers provide at airports in Class D airspace. 
This paper presents the static risk-benefit pathway, one of the three determined pathways for Class D ATCT. 
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1. Introduction 
ATCTs and the controllers that staff them provide both efficiency and safety services to the aviation industry. 
The primary responsibility of an ATCT controller is to prevent collisions between aircraft and other hazards (e.g., 
terrain, ground vehicles) on the airport surface and in the immediate vicinity of the airport [1]. Set in 1990, the 
Office of Policy and Plans (APO) developed criteria for the establishment and discontinuance of ATCT (FAA-APO-
90-7) [2]. However, operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) have and are continuing to transition to 
support Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiatives and other enhancements to the NAS. The 
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA’s) APO is reviewing and potentially updating the cost, safety benefit, and 
efficiency benefit criteria outlined in the 1990 policy for ATCT establishment; the focus of the review is on low 
volume tower operations, such as airports in Class D airspace. In examining the safety benefit of ATCT controllers, 
the safety service provided by tower controllers at towers with larger operations, such as the Core 30 airports, 
greatly exceeds the costs of establishing those towers. Controllers at larger operation towers are necessary to 
efficiently and safely manage air traffic. However, as the number of operations at a tower decreases, the costs of 
operating the tower may begin to outweigh the benefits. 
Local and ground controllers at ATCTs conduct activities related to, but not limited to, issuing clearances and 
information to pilots and vehicle operators, managing ground traffic, providing separation on active runways, and 
transferring any aircraft to the surrounding airspace’s controllers [1,3]. The complexity of those activities and the 
inclusion of additional activities depend upon the airport traffic, environmental conditions, and ATCT equipage 
level among many other variables. The ATCT equipage level varies from tower to tower typically with airports in 
more complex airspace (e.g., Core 30 airports) having a higher equipage level than airports in less complex airspace. 
Since ATCT controllers provide air traffic services for aircraft on the ground at the airport and in the immediate 
airspace surrounding the airport, ATCT controllers have the unique ability to physically see a majority of the traffic, 
airport movement areas, and surrounding airspace. Thus, it can be argued that the ATCT controller’s most vital tool 
is the controller’s eyes when utilized in conjunction with a radio for communications [3]. 
Prior internal FAA research of Class D airports identified potentially airport risk characteristic and classified 
those characteristics for towered airports in Class D airspace [4]. The impact those airport characteristics have on 
operations and controller performance has yet to be fully examined. With the focus on VATS, the purpose of this 
study is to assess the operational safety benefit provided by tower controllers in Class D airspace and to determine 
the potential safety benefit that a controller could have provided during safety events in non-towered operations. As 
part of the larger project [5], this paper presents the safety benefits and associated risks with the previously 
identified hazards representing static hazards. 
2. Methodology 
For the safety benefits assessment of VATS operations, a sample of 35 FAA towered airports in Class D airspace 
was identified. Utilizing a previous FAA study [4], the airport risk characteristics were identified for each of the 
airports in the sample set. Narrative safety data for the airport sample set was gathered from the FAA’s Air Traffic 
Safety Action Program (ATSAP). ATSAP is a voluntary, non-punitive reporting system for air traffic controllers. 
ATSAP reports submitted by controllers at the sample airports for the calendar years of 2011, 2012, and 2013 time 
period were queried, resulting in 792 reports and safety event narratives. The focus of the ATSAP program is to 
provide the air traffic community an outlet for reporting a safety event that might otherwise have gone unknown. 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the safety benefits that controllers provide in the control tower 
environment. The 792 ATSAP reports were filtered to identify those reports describing a safety event where the 
controller provided a safety benefit. The question examined in the filtering exercise was, “Did the controller provide 
a service that reduced the severity or consequences of the safety event described in the report?” Each of the 792 
ATSAP reports were examined with the question by at least two human factors subject matter experts (SMEs), 
resulting in 175 ATSAP reports identified as describing a safety event where a controller provided a safety benefit. 
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Fig. 1. AirTracs Framework. 
2.1. Classification of benefits and risks 
The filtered 175 ATSAP reports were classified with the Air Traffic Analysis and Classification System 
(AirTracs) utilizing the consensus method, which required a consensus or agreement on the causal factors 
contributing to the report by a panel. The panel members included human factors experts, retired air traffic 
controllers, and flight deck experts. AirTracs provides a framework for systematically and thoroughly examining the 
impact of human performance on air traffic accidents and incidents. The framework of the AirTracs causal category 
model is based on the Department of Defense (DoD) Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
model [6], while the detailed causal factors incorporate factors from Human Error in ATM (HERA) and JANUS [7]. 
The AirTracs framework promotes the identification of causal trends by allowing factors ranging from the 
immediate operator context to agency-wide influences to be traced to individual events [8]. The causal category 
model is displayed below in Figure 1.  
To determine the risks or latent factors present, each report was evaluated across all levels of the AirTracs 
framework, and the presence or absence of each AirTracs causal category was recorded. It is important to note that 
the AirTracs categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, an individual report can include both an execution 
act and a decision act. To determine the safety benefits present, each safety benefit was classified with the FAA’s 
strategic job analysis for the tower domain [9]. In order to identify risk-benefit pathways, associations among 
AirTracs factors and safety benefit tasks were measured. Starting at the highest AirTracs tier and continuing to the 
lowest AirTracs tier, the relationship among the factors within the tier, the various factors at lower tiers, the strategic 
job tasks, and airport characteristics were examined using a Pearson’s chi-square test to measure the statistical 
strength of the associations. In the instances where the assumptions of the Pearson’s chi-square test were not met, a 
Fisher’s Exact Test was conducted [10]. If the relationship resulted in a significant association identified through the 
Pearson’s chi-square test or Fisher’s Exact Test (p<0.05), the odds ratio value was calculated for that particular 
association [10]. 
3. Results 
When examining the safety benefits that tower controllers provide at the sample set of FAA staffed towered 
airports in Class D airspace, the three following human factors safety-benefit pathways emerged: Dynamic Risk-
Benefit Pathway, Static Risk-Benefit Pathway, and Communication Risk-Benefit Pathway. The human factors 
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safety-benefit pathways represent key associations among AirTracs factors, safety-critical tasks, and airport 
characteristics. This paper will present the findings for the Static Risk-Benefit Pathway. The second human factors-
safety risk-benefit pathway incorporates how a controller at a Class D towered airport provided a safety-benefit 
service to mitigate a static risk and can be found in Figure 2.  
The central blue box in the risk-benefit pathway graphic depicts the AirTracs factors that presented a key risk to 
operations in the ATSAP reports. The risk factors represent a combination of the airport characteristics previously 
identified through an internal FAA study (e.g., Proximity to Mountains) and contributing factors from the 
application of AirTracs (e.g., Unexpected Signage / Ground Markings). For this pathway, these risks, while not 
permanent, do not change without significant effort. Additionally, if one of these factors were said to present for an 
airport, then the factor was present during all operations, but the impact of the factor varied from event to event. 
These risk factors represent static airport characteristics that are present during all operations at an airport. These 
factors are not necessarily permanent airport features, but they would require a significant effort to change (e.g. 
Unexpected Signage / Ground Markings). Though present during all operations, these factors may not directly 
impact every operation equally. For example, if a Class D airport in the sample set was located in the vicinity of a 
Class C airport, the Class C airport has the ability to be relocated but a relocation would be unlikely and difficult. 
Additionally, while the Class C airspace is relatively constant during the Class D airport’s operations, the Class C 
airspace many not always present a risk or hazard to operations. If the Class C airspace is to the north of the Class D 
airport, the Class D airport’s departure traffic may never approach the Class C airspace boundary if the Class D 
airport departure traffic is departing to the south. 
Those static risk factors were found to be unexpected signage / ground markings, proximity to mountains, 
proximity to special use airspace (SUA), and Class C airport proximity. The classification level values in Table 1 are 
represented in one of two manners: 1) For airport characteristics, 14.29% of the sampled towered airports are in 
proximity to mountains; 2) For AirTracs factors, in 8.49% of the ATSAP reports classified, unexpected signage / 
ground markings were a contributing factor. As previously mentioned, these risk are present during most operations 
but do not necessarily impact all operations. It is necessary to examine the latent factors associated with these static 
risk factors to better understand when and how those factors impact other factors. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Static Risk-Benefit Pathway. 
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Table 1. Risk Factors Classification Level – Static Risk-Benefit Pathway. 
Risk Factor Percentage of Classified Reports or Airports 
Proximity to Mountains 14.29% of the Sampled Towered Airports 
Proximity to SUA 11.43% of the Sampled Towered Airports 
Unexpected Signage / Ground Markings 8.49% of ATSAP Reports 
Class C Airport Proximity 5.71% of the Sampled Towered Airports 
 
The left gray box in the risk-benefit pathway graphic depicts the contributing factors associated with the risk 
factors. Those contributing factors found to be associated with the static risk factors were intersecting runways and 
proximity to Part 141 flight schools. The classification levels in Table 2 can be interpreted in the following way: 
68.57% of the sampled towered airports have intersecting runways. 
Table 2. Contributing Factor Classification Level – Static Risk-Benefit Pathway. 
Contributing Factor Percentage of Classified Reports or Airports 
Intersecting Runways 68.57% of the Sampled Towered Airports 
Proximity to Part 141 Flight School 57.14% of the Sampled Towered Airports 
 
In order for the contributing factor to be included in the pathway, the contributing factors had to have a statistical 
association with at least one of the risk factors. Table 3 depicts the associations and their odds ratios between the 
contributing factors and risk factors. For those pairings with odds ratios, the pairing was first found to be statistically 
significant via the Pearson’s Chi Square test or Fisher’s Exact Test (p < 0.05). Upon being found significant, the 
odds ratio for the pairing was determined. The odds ratio can be interpreted in the following way: when a report was 
found to include intersecting runways as a contributing factor, the odds of the report also including unexpected 
signage / ground markings were 3.413 times greater than those reports that did not indicate intersecting runways as a 
factor.  
Table 3. Contributing Factors – Risk Factors Associations Odds Ratios – Static Risk-Benefit Pathway/ 
 Risk Factors 
Contributing Factors Unexpected Signage / Ground Markings 
Intersecting Runways 3.413 
Proximity or Part 141 Flight School 9.244 
 
The right orange box in the risk-benefit pathway graphic depicts the safety benefits provided by a controller 
through safety-critical tasks. These safety-critical tasks depict how a controller identified, responded to, and 
recovered from the static risks. For the static risk-benefit pathway, the safety benefits provided by tower controller 
tasks related to resolving airspace or movement area conflicts, and Table 4 shows the level of classification for the 
benefit. The values in Table 4 can be interpreted in the following way: in 40.57% of the ATSAP reports classified, a 
controller performed safety-critical tasks related to resolving airspace or movement area conflicts. 
Table 4. Benefit Factor Classification Level – Static Risk-Benefit Pathway. 
Benefit Percentage of Reports 
Resolving Airspace or Movement Area Conflicts 40.57% of ATSAP Reports 
 
In order for the safety benefit to be included in the pathway, at least one of the risk factors had to have a 
statistically significant association with the safety benefit. Table 5 depicts the associations and their odds ratios. For 
those pairings with odds ratios, the pairing was first found to be statistically significant via the Pearson’s Chi Square 
test or Fisher’s Exact Test (p < 0.05). Upon being found significant, the odds ratio for the pairing was determined. 
The odds ratio can be interpreted in the following way: when a report was found to include an unexpected signage / 
ground markings as a risk factor, the odds of the report including the safety-benefit tasks associated with resolving 
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airspace or movement area conflicts were 5.93 times greater than those reports not including unexpected signage / 
ground markings. 
Table 5. Risk Factor – Safety Benefit Associations Odds Ratios – Static Risk-Benefit Pathway 
 Risk Factor 
Safety Benefit 
Inadequate Signage / 
Ground Markings 
Proximity to 
Mountains 
Proximity to 
SUA 
Class C Airport 
Proximity 
Resolving Airspace or Movement Area 
Conflicts (S22) 5.93 2.57 6.11 12.06 
4. Discussion 
One of the key risk factors in the static risk-benefit pathway is the presence of unexpected signage / ground 
markings. The signage / ground markings risk factor was found to be associated with the intersecting runways 
contributing factor. When an airport has intersecting runways, the airport will have more signage / ground markings 
in order to protect and make pilots aware of the runways and their intersections. The signage / ground markings 
factor was most linked to events where pilots found the runway holding position markings to be unusually far from 
the runway, resulting in either a pilot passing the runway holding position markings entering an active runway or a 
pilot not fully passing the runway holding position markings when exiting a runway. These safety event 
investigations found the placement of the runway holding position markings to be further from the runway at the 
airports where this was a factor than the placement of the runway holding position markings at the airports where 
this was not a factor. The distance of the runway holding position markings from the runway depend on the 
wingspan of the airport traffic. Most of the airports in the Class D sample set serve the light general aviation aircraft 
community, and these pilots become accustom to the characteristics of the Class D airport. If the Class D airport 
also serves larger aircraft, the runway holding position markings have to accommodate the wingspan of those larger 
aircraft causing the placement of the runway holding position markings to not match the mental model of the 
traditional light general aviation community. In the event that an aircraft exiting the runway does not fully pass the 
runway holding position markings leaving the tail of the aircraft over the markings, the controller may have to 
recover from the runway incursion by issuing missed approach instructions to aircraft on final or canceling takeoff 
clearances to departing aircraft. 
A large portion of the tasks completed by air traffic controllers directly contributes to the safe operations of both 
commercial and general aviation operations. By systematically analyzing these tasks and operational events, the 
actual safety benefits present in NAS operations can be identified and measured. The results could serve to identify 
particular types of operations where a controller could provide the largest potential safety benefit. It is easy to 
identify the need for a tower controller at airport with larger operations, such as the Core 30 airports. Conversely, 
not all airports, such as those airports with minimal operations, necessitate the presence of an ATCT and the 
controllers who staff them. Determining the criteria for staffing or not staffing an ATCT is a question that involves 
both efficiency and safety measures. Efficiency can be measured with quantifiable metrics, such as throughput and 
sequencing. However, safety is sometimes viewed as an intrinsic measure with the most reference measures being 
accident statistics. With the level of safety in the NAS, it is important to extend the safety metrics and measures to 
include those actions by controllers that prevent accidents and incidents.  
It is worth noting that these findings are based on voluntary safety reports. Those safety reports are not intended 
to be an all-encompassing view of operations. However, those voluntary safety reports typically include a narrative 
where the reporter, either a controller or pilot, can provide details into a safety event and daily operations that may 
have otherwise gone undocumented. It is suggested that these findings should be paired with additional safety 
findings that are not voluntary reporting systems. Pairing the risk-benefit pathways findings with traditional safety 
data and frequency analyses, which are typically more outcome driven rather than causal driven, will help to 
develop a thorough view of airport operations and of how a controller can provide and has provided a safety benefit 
in response to hazards or airport characteristics. 
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5. Conclusion 
ATCT controllers support both safety and efficiency. Understanding the benefit of controllers in small tower 
environments is crucial to determining what criteria best supports decision-making in the staffing of these towers in 
Class D airspace. Maximizing the controller benefit depends on many variables. Accounting for the various types of 
hazards and their impacts on operations by using sample airports and voluntary reporting supplies researchers with 
often otherwise undocumented insight and data. Analyzing relationships among these factors and benefits reveals 
statistically significant pathways that link airport characteristics and key risk factors to controller provided safety 
benefits. This method, once paired with further research utilizing non-voluntary reporting data sources, can form the 
basis for data-driven decision-making. From the single example described, the static risk-benefit pathway, a part of 
the starting elements for providing insight into safety benefits provided by controllers in Class D airports has been 
determined. Each of these pathways brings us a step closer to maximizing the ATCT service the public values most 
– ensuring separation. 
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